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Abstract—2.5 player parity games combine the challenges
posed by 2.5 player reachability games and the qualitative
analysis of parity games. These two types of problems are
best approached with different types of algorithms: strategy
improvement algorithms for 2.5 player reachability games and
recursive algorithms for the qualitative analysis of parity games.
We present a method that—in contrast to existing techniques—
tackles both aspects with the best suited approach and works
exclusively on the 2.5 player game itself. The resulting technique
is powerful enough to handle games with several million states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Parity games are non-terminating zero sum games between
two players, Player 0 and Player 1. The players move a token
along the edges of a finite graph without sinks. The vertices
are coloured, i.e. labelled with a priority taken from the set of
natural numbers. The infinite sequence of vertices visited by
the token is called the run of a graph, and each run is coloured
according to the minimum priority that appears infinitely often
on the run. A run is winning for a player if the parity of its
colour agrees with the parity of the player.
Parity games come in two flavours: games with random
moves, also called 2.5 player games, and games without
random moves, called 2 player games. For 2 player games, the
adversarial objectives of the two players are to ensure that the
lowest priority that occurs infinitely often is even (for Player 0)
and odd (for Player 1), respectively. For 2.5 player games, the
adversarial objectives of the two players are to maximise the
likelihood that the lowest priority that occurs infinitely often
is even resp. odd.
Solving parity games is the central and most expensive step
in many model checking [1]–[5], satisfiability checking [1],
[3], [6], [7], and synthesis [8], [9] methods. As a result,
efficient algorithms for 2 player parity games have been
studied intensively [1], [10]–[26].
Parity games with 2.5 players have recently attracted atten-
tion [27]–[35]. This attention, however, does not mean that
results are similarly rich or similarly diverse as for 2 player
games. Results on the existence of pure strategies and on
approximation algorithms [29], [31] are decades younger than
similar results for 2 player games, while algorithmic solutions
[27], [28] focus on strategy improvement techniques only.
The qualitative counterpart of 2.5 player games, where one
of the players has the goal to win almost surely while the other
one wants to win with a non-zero chance, can be reduced
to 2 player parity games, cf. [36] or attacked directly on
the 2.5 player game with recursive algorithm [37]. The more
interesting quantitative analysis can be approached through a
reduction to 2.5 player reachability games [38], which can then
be attacked with strategy improvement algorithms [16], [17],
[25], [26], [39]. Alternatively, entangled strategy improvement
algorithms can also run concurrently the 2.5 player parity game
directly (for the quantitative aspects) and on a reduction to 2
player parity games (for the qualitative aspects) [27], [28].
(Or, likewise, run on the larger game with an ordered quality
measure that gives preference to the likelihood to win and uses
the progress measure from [19] or [18] as a tie-breaker.)
This raises the question if strategy improvement techniques
can be directly applied on 2.5 player parity games, especially
as such games are memoryless determined and therefore
satisfy a main prerequisite for the use of strategy improvement
algorithms. The short answer is that strategy algorithms for
2.5 player parity games simply do not work. Classical strategy
improvement algorithms follow a joint pattern. They start with
an arbitrary strategy f for one of the players (say Player 0).
This strategy f maps each vertex of Player 0 to a successor,
and thus resolves all moves of Player 0. This strategy is then
improved by changing the strategy f at positions, where it is
profitable to do so. The following steps are applied repeatedly
until there is no improvement in Step 2.
1) Evaluate the simpler game resulting from fixing f .
2) Identify all changes to f that, when applied once, lead to
an improvement.
3) Obtain a new strategy f ′ from f by selecting some subset
of these changes.
So where does this approach go wrong? The first step works
fine. After fixing a strategy for Player 0, we obtain a 1.5 player
parity game, which can be solved efficiently with standard
techniques [40]. It is also not problematic to identify the
profitable switches in the second step. The winning probability
for the respective successor vertex provides a natural measure
for the profitability of a switch. We will show in Section V
that, as usual for strategy improvement, any combination of
such profitable switches will lead to an improvement.
The problem arises with the optimality guarantees. Strategy
improvement algorithms guarantee that a strategy that cannot
be improved is optimal. In the next paragraph, we will see an
example, where this is not the case. Moreover, we will see that
it can be necessary to change several decisions in a strategy f
in order to obtain an improvement, something which is against
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Fig. 1. A probabilistic parity game Pe.
the principles of strategy improvement.
A. An illustrating example
Consider the example 2.5 player parity game Pe depicted
in Figure 1. Square vertices are controlled by Player 0, while
triangular ones are controlled by Player 1. In circular vertices,
a random successor vertex is chosen with the given probability.
In vw, Player 0 wins with certainty (and therefore in particular
almost surely), while she loses with certainty in vl. In v0.55 (or
v0.95), Player 0 wins with probability 0.55 (or 0.95). For the
nodes v0 and v1, we can see that the mutually optimal strategy
for Player 0 and Player 1 are to play e0,2 and e1,1, respectively.
Player 0 therefore wins with probability 0.95 when the game
starts in v0 and both players play optimally.
B. Naive strategy iteration
Strategy iteration algorithms start with an arbitrary strategy,
and use an update rule to get profitable switches These are
edges, where the new target vertex has a higher probability of
reaching the winning region (when applied once) compared to
the current vertex. As usual with strategy improvement, any
combination of profitable switches leads to a strictly better
strategy for Player 0. We illustrate that, if done naively, it
may lead to values that are only locally maximal. Assume
that initially Player 0 chooses the edge e0,1 from v0, then the
best counter strategy of Player 1 is to choose e1,2 from v1.
The winning probability for Player 0 under these strategies is
0.55.
In strategy iteration, an update rule allows a player to switch
actions only if the switching offers some improvement. Since
by switching to the edge e0,2 Player 0 would obtain the same
winning probability, no strategy iteration can be applied, and
the algorithm terminates with a sub-optimal solution.
Let us try to get some insights from this problem. Observe
that Player 1 can entrap the play in the left vertices v0 and
v1 when Player 0 chooses the edge e0,2, such that the almost
sure winning region of Player 0 cannot be reached. However,
this comes to the cost of losing almost surely for Player 1,
as the dominating colour on the resulting run is 0. Broadly
speaking, Player 0 must find a strategy that maximises her
chance of reaching her almost sure winning regions, but only
under the constraint that the counter strategy of Player 1 does
not introduce new almost sure winning regions for Player 0.
C. Solutions from the literature
In the literature, two different solutions to this problem have
been discussed. Neither of these solutions works fully on the
game graph of the 2.5 player parity game. Instead, one of them
uses a reduction to reachability games through a simple gadget
construction [38], while the other uses strategy improvement
on two levels, for the qualitative update described above, and
for an update within subgames of states that have the same
value [27], [28]; this requires to keep a pair of entangled
strategies.
Gadget construction for a reduction to reachability
games: In [38], it is shown that 2.5 player parity games
can be solved by reducing them to 2.5 player reachability
games and solving them, e.g. by using a strategy improvement
approach. For this reduction, one can use the simple gadgets
shown in Figure 2. There, when a vertex is passed by,
the token goes to an accepting sink with probability wprob
and to a losing sink with probability lprob, both depending
on the priority of the node (and continues otherwise as in
the parity game). For accordingly chosen wprob, lprob, any
optimal strategy for this game is an optimal strategy for the
parity game. To get this guarantee, however, the termination
probabilities have to be very small indeed. In [38], they are
constructed from the expression (n!222n+3M2n2)−1 where n
is the number of vertices and M is an integer depending on
the probabilities occurring in the model. Unfortunately, these
small probabilities render this approach very inefficient and
introduces numerical instability.
Classic strategy improvement for 2.5 player parity games:
In [27], [28], the concept of strategy improvement algorithms
has been extended to 2.5 player parity games. To overcome
the problem that the natural quality measure—the likelihood of
winning—is not fine enough, this approach constructs classical
2 player games played on translations of the value classes (the
set of vertices with the same likelihood of winning). These
subgames are translated using a gadget construction similar
to the one used for qualitative solutions for 2.5 player to a
solution to 2 player games from [36]. This results in the 2
player game shown in Figure 3.
The strategy improvement algorithm keeps track of ‘wit-
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Fig. 3. The qualitative game resulting from the game from Figure 1 when
using the gadget construction from [36].
nesses ω = (pi, piQ)’, which consists of a strategy pi on the
2.5 player parity game, and a strategy piQ defined on the 2
player game Q obtained from this 2.5 player game using the
gadget construction from [36]. The strategies are entangled in
that pi is the translation1 of piQ. That is, the strategies have
to concur on the nodes of Player 0 from the 2.5 player game,
and each update on pi (resp. piQ) on the decisions from these
vertices will translate to an update on the strategy of piQ (resp.
pi) on the same vertices.
The valuation of one of these vertices is an ordered pair,
consisting of the chance of obtaining the parity objective as
the primary measure, and the value obtained in the quantitative
game restricted to the individual value classes (vertices with
the same chance of obtaining the parity objective) as a
secondary measure [27], [28].
D. Novel strategy iteration algorithm
We show that we can apply strategy improvement tech-
niques with two different update rules directly on the 2.5
player game. The first rule is a standard update rule for increas-
ing the chance of reaching the almost sure winning region. As
we have seen in the example, this rule would not necessarily
find the optimum: it would not find the improvement from
edge e0,1 to e0,2. To overcome this problem, we introduce a
second rule that handles the problem that Player 1 can reduce
the chances of reaching the almost sure winning region of
1In the notation of [27], [28], pi = Tralmost(piQ).
Player 0 by playing a strategy that leads to a larger almost
sure winning region for Player 0. This step uses a reduction
to the qualitative evaluation of these games. Player 0 changes
her strategy in a way that she would win on the subgame
that consists only of the edges of Player 0 and Player 1 that
are neutral. For both players, these are the edges that lead to
successor states with the same chance of winning under the
current strategy. If this provides a larger almost sure winning
region for Player 0 than f , then update f in this new winning
region accordingly leads to a strictly better strategy f ′.
While the first rule alone is not powerful enough, the two
rules together provide the guarantee that a strategy that cannot
be improved by either of them is optimal.
Note that the second rule is a non-standard rule for strategy
improvement. Not only does it not rely on an improvement that
is obtained when a change is applied once, it also requires to
apply a fixed set of changes (in the new region) in one step
for correctness. This is quite unusual for strategy improvement
algorithms, where the combination of updates selected is
irrelevant for correctness.
A further significant difference to the method from [27],
[28] is that we do not have to revert to solving trans-
formed games. Instead, we use the new generalisation of
McNaughton’s algorithm to the qualitative solution of 2.5
player parity games [37]. This method seems to maintain
the good practical performance known for classic recursive
techniques, which have proven to be much faster than strategy
improvement for the qualitative analysis of parity games [41].
A consequence of this choice is that we solve the qualitative
games completely when there is no progress through the naive
update step, which reduces the number of times that qualitative
updates have to be considered.
This way, we use strategy improvement for the quantitative
part of the analysis, where it has its strengths, while leaning
on a variation [37] of McNaughton’s algorithm [10], [12],
[14] for the qualitative part of the analysis, where prior
research suggests that recursive algorithms outperform strategy
improvement [41].
Note that our quality measure strategy improvement is
the same as the primary measure used in classical strategy
improvement for 2.5 player parity games [27], [28]. Different
from that approach, we do not need to resort to gadget
constructions for progressing within value classes, but can
overcome the lack of progress w.r.t. the primary measure
through invoking a performant algorithm for solving 2.5 player
games quantitatively [37].
E. Organisation of the Paper
We first introduce the standard terms and concepts in
Section II. We then recall the strategy improvement algorithms
in Section III, describe our algorithm in Section IV, show its
correctness in Section V, and offer an experimental evaluation
in Section VI.
II. TERMS AND CONCEPTS
A probability distribution over a finite set A is a function
µ : A → [0, 1] ∩ Q with ∑a∈A µ(a) = 1. By Distr(A) we
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denote the set of probability distributions over A.
Definition 1: An arena is a tuple A = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob),
where
• V0, V1, and Vr are three finite disjoint sets of vertices
owned by the three players: Player 0, Player 1, and Player
random, respectively. Let V def= V0 ∪ V1 ∪ Vr;
• E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges such that (V,E) is a sinkless
directed graph, i.e. for each v ∈ V there exists v′ ∈ V
such that (v, v′) ∈ E; for σ ∈ {0, 1, r} we let Eσ def=
E ∩ (Vσ × V ).
• prob : Vr → Distr(V ) is the successor distribution
function. We require that for each v ∈ Vr and each
v′ ∈ V , prob(v)(v′) > 0 if and only if (v, v′) ∈ E.
If V0 = ∅ or V1 = ∅, we call A a Markov decision
process (MDP) or 1.5 player game. If both V0 = V1 = ∅,
we call A a Markov chain (MC). Given an arena A =
(V0, V1, Vr, E, prob), we define the following concepts.
• A play is an infinite sequence pi = v0v1v2v3 . . . such that
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i ∈ N. We define pi(i) def= vi. We
denote by Play(A) the set of all plays of A.
• For σ ∈ {0, 1}, a (pure memoryless) strategy fσ of
Player σ is a mapping fσ : Vσ → V from the vertices
Vσ of Player σ to their successor states, i.e. for each
v ∈ Vσ , (v, fσ(v)) ∈ E. We denote the set of Player 0
and 1 strategies by Strats0 and Strats1, respectively.
• Given a strategy f0 for Player 0, we define the induced
MDP as Af0 = (∅, V1, Vr ∪V0, Ef0 , probf0) with Ef0
def
=
(E \ V0 × V ) ∪ { (v, f0(v)) | v ∈ V0 } and
probf0(v)(v
′)def=


prob(v)(v′) if v∈Vr ,
1 if v∈V0 and v′=f0(v),
0 otherwise,
and similarly for Player 1.
• Given strategies f0, f1 for Player 0 and Player 1, respec-
tively, we denote by Af0,f1
def
= (Af0)f1 the induced MC
of the strategies.
• If A is an MC, we denote by PA(v) : ΣA → [0, 1] the
uniquely induced [42] probability measure on ΣA, the σ-
algebra on the cylinder sets of the plays of A, under the
condition that the initial node is v. For general A, we let
P
A
f0,f1
(v)
def
= PAf0 ,f1 (v).
Definition 2: A 2.5 player game, also referred to as Markov
game (MG), is a tuple P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win), where
A = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob) is an arena and win ⊆ Play(A) is
the winning condition for Player 0, the set of plays for which
Player 0 wins.
The notions of plays, strategies, induced 1.5 player games, etc.
extend to 2.5 player games by considering their underlying
arena.
We consider two types of winning conditions, reachability
and parity objectives.
Definition 3: A 2.5 player reachability game is a 2.5 player
game P in which the winning condition win is defined by a
target set R ⊆ V . Then, we have win = { pi ∈ Play(P) | ∃i ≥
0 : pi(i) ∈ R }. For 2.5 player reachability games, we also use
the notation P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,R).
Definition 4: A 2.5 player parity game (MPG) is a 2.5
player game P in which the winning condition win is defined
by the priority function pri : V → N mapping each vertex
to a natural number. We call the image of pri the set of
priorities (or: colours), denoted by C. Note that, since V
is finite, C is finite as well. We extend pri to plays, using
pri : pi 7→ lim infi→∞ pri(pi(i)). Then, we have win = { pi ∈
Play(P) | pri(pi) is even }. For 2.5 player parity games, we
also use the notation P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob, pri). We denote
with |P| the size of a 2.5 player parity game, referring to the
space its overall representation takes.
Note that in the above discussion we have defined strategies
as mappings from vertices of the respective player to successor
vertices. More general definitions of strategies exist that e.g.
use randomised choices (imposing a probability distributions
over the edges chosen) or take the complete history of the
game so far into account. However, it is known that, for
finite 2.5 player parity and reachability games, the simple
pure memoryless strategies we have introduced above suffice
to obtain mutually optimal infima and suprema [36].
We also use the common intersection and subtraction oper-
ations on directed graphs for arenas and games: given an MG
P with arena A = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob),
• P ∩ V ′ denotes the MG P ′ we obtain when we restrict
the arena A to A∩V ′ def= (V0 ∩V ′, V1 ∩V ′, Vr ∩V ′, E ∩
(V ′ × V ′), prob↾V ′∩Vr ),
• for E′ ⊇ Er, we denote by P ∩E′ the MG P ′ we obtain
when restricting arena A to A ∩ E′ def= (V0, V1, Vr, E ∩
E′, prob).
Note that the result of such an intersection may or may
not be substochastic or contain sinks. While we use these
operations freely in intermediate constructions, we make sure
that, whenever they are treated as games, they have no sinks
and are not substochastic.
Definition 5: Let P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win) be a 2.5
player game, and let f0 and f1 two strategies for player 0 and
1 respectively. The value valPf0,f1 : V → [0, 1] is defined as
valPf0,f1(v)
def
= PPf0,f1(v)({ pi ∈ Play(P) | pi ∈ win }).
We also define
valPf0(v)
def
= inf
f ′
1
∈Strats1
valPf0,f ′1(v),
valPf1(v)
def
= sup
f ′
0
∈Strats0
valPf ′
0
,f1
(v),
valP(v) def= sup
f ′
0
∈Strats0
inf
f ′
1
∈Strats1
valPf ′
0
,f ′
1
(v).
We write valPf ′ ≥ valPf if, for all v ∈ V , valPf ′(v) ≥ valPf (v)
holds, and valPf ′ > val
P
f if val
P
f ′ ≥ valPf and valPf ′ 6= valPf
hold.
Definition 6: Given a vertex v ∈ V , a strategy fσ for
Player σ is called v-winning if, starting from v, Player σ
wins almost surely in the MDP defined by fσ (that is,
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valPfσ (v) = 1 − σ). For σ ∈ {0, 1}, a vertex v in V is v-
winning for Player σ if Player σ has a v-winning strategy
fσ. We call the set of v-winning vertices for Player σ the
winning region of Player σ, denoted Wσ . Note for v ∈ W0,
valP(v) = 1, whereas for v ∈W1 we have valP(v) = 0.
III. STRATEGY IMPROVEMENT
A strategy improvement algorithm takes a memoryless
strategy f of one player, in our case of Player 0, and either
infers that the strategy is optimal, or offers a family If of
strategies, such that, for all strategies f ′ ∈ If , valPf ′ > valPf
holds.
The family If is usually given through profitable switches.
In such a case, If is defined as follows.
Definition 7: Given a 2.5 player game P =
(V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win) and a strategy f for Player 0,
the profitable switches, denoted profit(P , f), for Player 0
are the edges that offer a strictly higher chance
of succeeding (under the given strategy). That is,
profit(P , f) = { (v, v′) ∈ E0 | valPf (v′) > valPf (v) }.
We also define the unprofitable switches accordingly as
loss(P , f) = { (v, v′) ∈ E0 | valPf (v′) < valPf (v) }.
If is the set of strategies that can be obtained from f by
applying one or more profitable switches to f : If = { f ′ ∈
Strats0 | f ′ 6= f and ∀v ∈ V0 : f ′(v) = f(v) or (v, f ′(v)) ∈
profit(P , f) }.
Strategy improvement methods can usually start with an
arbitrary strategy f0, which is then updated by selecting some
fi+1 ∈ Ifi until Ifi is eventually empty. This fi is then
guaranteed to be optimal. The update policy with which the
profitable switch or switches are selected is not relevant for
the correctness of the method, although it does impact on
the performance and complexity of the algorithms. In our
implementation, we use a ‘greedy switch all’ update policy,
that is we perform any switch we can perform and change the
strategy to the locally optimal switch.
For 2.5 player reachability games, strategy improvement
algorithms provide optimal strategies.
Theorem 1 (cf. [39]): For a 2.5 player reachability game P ,
a strategy improvement algorithm with the profitable switches
/ improved strategies as defined in Definition 7 terminates with
an optimal strategy for Player 0.
In the strategy improvement step, for all v ∈ V and all f ′ ∈
If , it holds that valPf ′(v) = valPf ′
(
f ′(v)
) ≥ valPf (f(v)) =
valPf
(
v
)
. Moreover, strict inequality is obtained at some vertex
in V . As we have seen in the introduction, this is not the case
for 2.5 player parity games: in the example from Figure 1, for
a strategy f with f(v0) = v0.55, the switch from edge e0,1 to
e0,2 is not profitable. Note, however, that it is not unprofitable
either.
IV. ALGORITHM
We observe that situations where the naive strategy improve-
ment algorithm described in the previous section gets stuck
are tableaux: an improvement would be available, but among
changes that are neutral in that applying them once would
neither lead to an increased nor to a decreased likelihood
of winning. As usual with strategy improvement algorithms,
neutral switches cannot generally be added to the profitable
switches: not only would one lose the guarantee to improve,
one can also reduce the likelihood of winning when applying
such changes.
Overcoming this problem is the main reason why strategy
improvement techniques for MPG would currently have to use
a reduction to 2.5 player reachability games (or other reduc-
tions), with the disadvantages discussed in the introduction.
We treat these tableaux directly and avoid reductions. We first
make formal what neutral edges are.
Definition 8: Given a 2.5 player game P =
(V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win) and a strategy f for Player 0,
we define the set of neutral edge neutral(P , f) as follows:
neutral(P , f) def= Er∪{ (v, v′) ∈ E0∪E1 | valPf (v′) = valPf (v) }.
Based on these neutral edges, we define an update policy
on the subgame played only on the neutral edges.
Definition 9: Given a 2.5 player game P =
(V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win) and a strategy f for Player
0, we define the neutral subgame of P for f as
P ′ = P ∩ neutral(P , f). Based on P ′ we define the
set I ′f of additional strategy improvements as follows.
Let W0 and W ′0 be the winning regions of Player 0 on P
and P ′, respectively. If W0 = W ′0, then I ′f = ∅. Otherwise,
let W be the set of strategies that are v-winning for Player 0
on P ′ for all vertices v ∈W ′0. Then we set
I ′′f =
{
f0 ∈ Strats0
∣∣∣∣ ∃fw∈W : ∀v∈W ′0 : f0(v) = fw(v)and ∀v/∈W ′0 : f0(v) = f(v)
}
,
I ′f = { f ′ ∈ I ′′f | ∀v ∈ W0 : f ′(v) = f(v) }.
We remark that W0 ⊆W ′0 always holds. Intuitively, we apply a
qualitative analysis on the neutral subgame, and if the winning
region of Player 0 on the neutral subgame is larger than her
winning region on the full game, then we use the new winning
strategy on the new part of the winning region. Intuitively, this
forces Player 1 to leave this area eventually (or to lose almost
surely). As he cannot do this through neutral edges, the new
strategy for Player 0 is superior over the old one.
Example 1: Consider again the example MPG Pe
from Figure 1 and the strategy such that f0(v0) =
v0.55. Under this strategy, neutral(Pe, f0) = Er ∪
{(v0, v0.55), (v0, v1), (v1, v0)}; the resulting neutral subgame
P ′e is the same as Pe except for the edge e1,1. In P ′e, the
winning region W ′0 is W ′0 = {v0, v1, vw}, while the original
region was W0 = {vw}. The two sets I ′f0 and I ′′f0 contain only
the strategy f ′0 such that f ′0(v0) = v1. In order to avoid to lose
almost surely in W ′0, Player 1 has to change his strategy from
f1(v1) = v0 to f ′1(v1) = v0.95 in Pe. Consequently, strategy
f ′0 is superior to f0: the resulting winning probability is not
0.55 but 0.95 for v0 and v1.
Note that using I ′f or I ′′f in the strategy iteration has
the same effect. Once a run has reached W0 in the neutral
subgame, it cannot leave it. Thus, changing the strategy f0
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from I ′′f to a strategy f ′ with f ′(v) = f(v) for v ∈ W0 and
f ′(v) = f0(v) for v /∈ W0 will not change the chance of
winning: valP
′
f0
= valP
′
f ′ and val
P
f0
= valPf ′ . This also implies
I ′′f 6= ∅ ⇒ I ′f 6= ∅, since I ′f contains all strategies that belong
to I ′′f and that agree with f only on the original winning
region W0. Using I ′f simplifies the proof of Lemma 1, but
it also emphasises that one does not need to re-calculate the
strategy on a region that is already winning.
Our extended strategy improvement algorithm applies up-
dates from either of these constructions until no further im-
provement is possible. That is, we can start with an arbitrary
Player 0 strategy f0 and then apply fi+1 ∈ Ifi ∪ I ′fi untilIfi = I ′fi = ∅. We will show that therefore fi is an optimal
Player 0 strategy.
For the algorithm, we need to calculate Ifi and I ′fi . Calcu-
lating Ifi requires only to solve 1.5 player parity games [40],
and we use ISCASMC [43], [44] to do so. Calculating I ′fi
requires only qualitative solutions of neutral subgame P ′. For
this, we apply the algorithm from [37].
A more algorithmic representation of our algorithm with a
number of minor design decisions is provided in Appendix A.
The main design decision is to favour improvements from Ifi
over those from I ′fi . This allows for calculating I ′fi only if Ifi
is empty. Starting with calculating Ifi first is a design decision,
which is slightly arbitrary. We have made it because solving
1.5 player games quantitatively is cheaper than solving 2.5
player games qualitatively and we believe that the guidance
for the search is, in practice, better in case of quantitative
results. Likewise, we have implemented a ‘greedy switch
all’ improvement strategy, simply because this is believed
to behave well in practice. We have, however, not collected
evidence for either decision and acknowledge that finding a
good update policy is an interesting line of future research.
V. CORRECTNESS
A. Correctness proof in a nutshell
The correctness proof combines two arguments: the cor-
rectness of all basic strategy improvement algorithms for
reachability games and a reduction from 2.5 player parity
games to 2.5 player reachability games with arbitrarily close
winning probabilities for similar strategy pairs. In a nutshell,
if we approximate close enough, then three properties hold for
a game P and a strategy f of Player 0:
1) all ‘normal’ strategy improvements of the parity game
correspond to strategy improvements in the reachability
game (Corollary 2);
2) if Player 0 has a larger winning region W ′0 in the neutral
subgame (cf. Definition 9) for P ∩neutral(P , f) than for
Pf , then replacing f by a winning strategy in I ′f leads to
an improved strategy in the reachability game (Lemma 1);
and
3) if neither of these two types of strategy improvements
are left, then a strategy improvement step on the related
2.5 player reachability game will not lead to a change
in the winning probability on the 2.5 player parity game
(Lemma 2).
B. Two game transformations
In this subsection we discuss two game transformations
that change the likelihood of winning only marginally and
preserve the probability of winning, respectively. The first
transformation turns 2.5 player parity games into 2.5 player
reachability games such that a strategy that is optimal strategy
for the reachability game is also optimal for the parity game
(cf. [38]).
Definition 10: Let P = (V0, V1, Vr , E, prob, pri), and let
ε ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ N. We define the 2.5 player reachability
game Pε,n = (V0, V1, V ′′r , E′′, prob′, {won}) with
• V ′′r = Vr∪V ′∪{won, lost}, where (i) V ′ contains primed
copies of the vertices; for ease of notation, the copy of
a vertex v is referred to as v′ in this construction; (ii)
won and lost are fresh vertices; they are a winning and a
losing sink, respectively;
• E′ = { (v, w′) | (v, w) ∈ E }∪{(won,won), (lost, lost)};
• E′′ = E′ ∪ { (v′, v) | v ∈ V } ∪ { (v′,won) | v ∈ V } ∪
{ (v′, lost) | v ∈ V };
• prob′(v)(w′) = prob(v)(w) for all v ∈ Vr and (v, w) ∈
E;
• prob′(v′)(won) = wprob
(
ε, n, pri(v)
)
,
• prob′(v′)(lost) = lprob
(
ε, n, pri(v)
)
,
• prob′(v′)(v) = 1 − wprob(ε, n, pri(v)) −
lprob
(
ε, n, pri(v)
)
for all v ∈ V , and
• prob′(won)(won) = prob′(lost)(lost) = 1.
where lprob,wprob : (0, 1)×N×N→ [0, 1] are two functions
with lprob(ε, n, c) + wprob(ε, n, c) ≤ 1 for all ε ∈ (0, 1) and
n, c ∈ N.
Intuitively, this translation replaces all the vertices by the
gadgets from Figure 2.
Note that Pε,n and P have similar memoryless strategies.
By a slight abuse of the term, we say that a strategy fσ of
Player σ on Pε,n is similar to her strategy f ′σ on P if f ′σ : v 7→
fσ(v)
′ holds, i.e. when v is mapped to w by fσ, then v is
mapped to w′ by f ′σ .
Theorem 2 (cf. [38]): Let P = (V0, V1, Vr , E, prob, pri) be a
2.5 player parity game. Then, there exists ε ∈ (0, 1), n ≥ |P|
such that we can construct Pε,n and the following holds: For
all strategies f0 ∈ Strats0, f1 ∈ Strats1, and all vertices v ∈
V ,
∣∣valPf0,f1(v)−valPε,nf ′0,f ′1(v)∣∣ < ε, ∣∣valPf0,f1(v)−valPε,nf ′0,f ′1(v′)∣∣ <
ε,
∣∣valPf0(v) − valPε,nf ′
0
(v)
∣∣ < ε, ∣∣valPf0(v) − valPε,nf ′
0
(v′)
∣∣ < ε,∣∣valPf1(v) − valPε,nf ′1 (v)∣∣ < ε, and ∣∣valPf1(v) − valPε,nf ′1 (v′)∣∣ < ε
holds, where f ′0 resp. f ′1 are similar to f0 resp. f1.
The results of [38] are stronger in that they show that the
probabilities grow sufficiently slow for the reduction to be
polynomial, but we use this construction only for correctness
proofs and do not apply it in our algorithms. For this reason,
existence is enough for our purpose. As [38] does not contain
a theorem that directly makes the statement above, we have
included a simple construction (without tractability claim) with
a correctness proof in Appendix B.
We will now introduce a second transformation that allows
us to consider changes in the strategies in many vertices at the
same time.
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Definition 11: Let P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob,win) and a
region R ⊆ V . Let FR = { f : R ∩ V0 → V | ∀v ∈ R :(
v, f(v)
) ∈ E } denote the set of memoryless strategies for
Player 0 restricted to R. The transformation results in a parity
game PR = (V ′0 , V ′1 , V ′r , E′, prob′, pri′) such that
• V ′′0 = V0∪R, V ′′′0 = (V0∩R)×FR, and V ′0 = V ′′0 ∪V ′′′0 ;
• V ′′1 = V1 \R, V ′′′1 = (V1∩R)×FR, and V ′1 = V ′′1 ∪V ′′′1 ;
• V ′′r = Vr \R, V ′′′r = (Vr∩R)×FR, and V ′r = V ′′r ∪V ′′′r ;
• E′ = { (v, w) ∈ E | v ∈ V \ R } ∪ { (v, (v, f)) | v ∈
R and f ∈ FR }∪{ ((v, f), (w, f)) | v, w ∈ R, (v, w) ∈
E and either v /∈ V0 or f(v) = w } ∪ { ((v, f), w) | v ∈
R, w /∈ R, (v, w) ∈ E and either v /∈ V0 or f(v) =
w };
• prob′(v)(w) = prob(v)(w), prob′
(
(v, f)
)
(w) =
prob(v)(w), and prob′
(
(v, f)
)(
(w, f)
)
= prob(v)(w);
and
• pri′(v) = pri(v) for all v ∈ V and pri′((v, f)) = pri(v)
otherwise.
Intuitively, the transformation changes the game so that, every
time R is entered, Player 0 has to fix her memoryless strategy
in the game. The fact that in the resulting game the strategy
f for Player 0 is fixed entering R is due to the jump from the
original vertex v to (v, f) whenever v ∈ R. Once in R, either
the part v of (v, f) is under the control of Player 1 or Player
random, i.e. v /∈ V0, so it behaves as in P , or the next state
w (or (w, f) if w ∈ R) is the outcome of f , i.e. w = f(v).
It is quite obvious that this transformation does not impact
on the likelihood of winning. In fact, Player 0 can simulate
every memoryless strategy f : V0 → V by playing a strategy
fR : V
′
0 → V ′ that copies f outside of R (i.e. for each v ∈
V0 \ R, fR(v) = f(v)) and moves to the f ↾R (i.e. f with
a preimage restricted to R) copy from states in R (i.e. for
each v ∈ V0 ∩ R, fR(v) = (v, f ↾R)): there is a one-to-
one correspondence between playing in P with strategy f and
playing in PR with strategy fR when starting in V .
Theorem 3: For all v ∈ V , all R ⊆ V , and all memoryless
Player 0 strategies f , valPf (v) = val
PR
fR
(
(v, f ↾R)
)
, valP(v) =
sup
f∈Strats0(P)
valP
R(
(v, f ↾R)
)
, and valP(v) = valP
R
(v) hold.
C. Correctness proof
For a given game P , we call an ε ∈ (0, 1) small if it is at
most 15 of the smallest difference between all probabilities of
winning that can occur on any strategy pair for any state in
any game PR for any R ⊆ V . For every small ε, we get the
following corollary from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 (preservation of profitable and unprofitable
switches): Let n ≥ |P|, let f be a Player 0 strategy for
P , f ′ the corresponding strategy for Pε,n, ε small, v ∈ V ,
w = f(v), and (v, u) ∈ E. Then valPf (u) > valPf (w) implies
val
Pε,n
f ′ (u) > val
Pε,n
f ′ (w
′), and valPf (u) < val
P
f (w) implies
val
Pε,n
f ′ (u) < val
Pε,n
f ′ (w
′).
It immediately follows that all combinations of profitable
switches can be applied, and will lead to an improved strategy:
for small ε, a profitable switch for fi from fi(v) = w to
fi+1(v) = u implies valPfi(u) ≥ valPfi(w) + 5ε since by
definition, we have that valPfi(u) > val
P
fi
(w) (as the switch
is profitable); in particular, valPfi(u) = valPfi(w) + δ with
δ ∈ R>0; since ε ≤ 15δ, we have that valPfi(u) ≥ valPfi(w)+5ε.
The triangular inequalities provided by Theorem 2 imply that
val
Pε,n
f ′
i
(u′) ≥ valPε,n
f ′
i
(w′) + 3ε, since
∣∣valPfi − valPε,nf ′i ∣∣ < ε.
Consequently, since under f ′i+1 we have that val
Pε,n
f ′
i+1
(v′) =
val
Pε,n
f ′
i
(u′), it follows that valPε,n
f ′
i+1
(v) ≥ valPε,n
f ′
i
(v) + 3ε, and,
using triangulation again, we get valPfi+1(v) ≥ valPfi(v) + ε.
Thus, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2: Let P be a given 2.5 player parity game, and fi
be a strategy with profitable switches (profit(P , fi)6=∅). Then,
Ifi 6= ∅, and for all fi+1 ∈ Ifi , valPfi+1>valPfi .
We now turn to the case that there are no profitable
switches for f in the game P . Corollary 1 shows that, for
the corresponding strategy f ′ in Pε,n, all profitable switches
lie within the neutral edges for f in P , provided f has no
profitable switches.
We expand the game by fixing the strategy of Player 0 for
the vertices in R∩V0 for a region R ⊆ V . The region we are
interested in is the winning region of Player 0 in the neutral
subgame P ∩ neutral(P, f). The game is played as follows.
For every strategy fR : R∩ V0 → V such that
(
r, fR(r)
) ∈
E holds for all r ∈ R, the game has a copy of the original
game intersected with R, where the choices of Player 0 on
the vertices in R are fixed to the single choice defined by the
respective strategy fR. We define ‖P‖ = max{ |PR| | R ⊆
V }.
We consider the case where the almost sure winning region
of Player 0 in the neutral subgame P ′ = P ∩ neutral(P , fi)
is strictly larger than her winning region in Pfi .
Lemma 1: Let P be a given 2.5 player parity game, and fi be
a strategy such that the winning region W ′0 for Player 0 in the
neutral subgame P ′=P∩neutral(P , fi) is strictly larger than
her winning region W0 in Pfi . Then I ′fi 6=∅ and, ∀fi+1∈I ′fi ,
valPfi+1>val
P
fi
.
Proof. The argument is an extension of the common argument
for strategy improvement made for the modified reachability
game. We first recall that the strategies in I ′fi differ from fi
only on the winning region W ′0 of Player 0 in the neutral
subgame P ′. Assume that we apply the change once: the first
time W ′0 is entered, we play the new strategy, and after it is
left, we play the old strategy. If the reaction of Player 1 is to
stay in W ′0, Player 0 will win almost surely in P . If he leaves
it, the value is improved due to the fact that Player 1 has to
take a disadvantageous edge to leave it.
Consider the game PW ′0 and fix fi+1 ∈ I ′fi . Using The-
orem 3, this implies that, when first in a state v ∈ W ′0,
Player 0 moves to (v, fi+1) for some fi+1 ∈ I ′fi , then
the likelihood of winning is either improved or 1 for any
counter strategy of Player 1. For all v ∈ W ′0 \ W0, this
implies a strict improvement. For an n ≥ ‖P‖ and a
small ε, we can now follow the same arguments as for the
Corollaries 1 and 2 on PW ′0 to establish that valPW
′
0
(fi+1)W ′
0
>
7
valP
W ′
0
(fi)W ′
0
holds, where the inequality is obtained through
the same steps: valP
W ′
0
(fi)W ′
0
(
(v, fi+1|W0)
)
> valP
W ′
0
(fi)W ′
0
(v) im-
plies valP
W ′
0
(fi)W ′
0
(
(v, fi+1|W0)
) ≥ valPW ′0(fi)W ′
0
(v) + 5ε; this im-
plies valP
W ′
0
ε,n
(fi)W ′
0
(
(v, fi+1|W0)′
) ≥ valPW ′0ε,n(fi)W ′
0
(v) + 3ε; and
this implies valP
W ′
0
ε,n
(fi+1)W ′
0
(v) = val
PW
′
0
ε,n
(fi+1)W ′
0
(
(v, fi+1|W0)′
) ≥
val
PW
′
0
ε,n
(fi)W ′
0
(v) + 3ε and we finally get valP
W ′
0
(fi+1)W ′
0
(v) =
valP
W ′
0
(fi+1)W ′
0
(
(v, fi+1|W0)
)
> valP
W ′
0
(fi)W ′
0
(v).
With Theorem 3, we obtain that valPfi+1 > val
P
fi
holds. 
Let us finally consider the case where there are no profitable
switches for Player 0 in Pfi and her winning region on the
neutral subgame P∩neutral(P , fi) coincides with her winning
region in Pfi .
Lemma 2: Let P be an MPG and fi be a strategy such that
the set of profitable switches is empty and the neutral subgame
P ∩ neutral(P , fi) has the same winning region for Player 0
as her winning region in Pfi (Ifi = I ′fi = ∅). Then, every
individual profitable switch in the reachability game Pε,n from
fi to fi+1 implies valPfi+1 = val
P
fi
and neutral(P , fi+1) =
neutral(P , fi).
Proof. When there are no profitable switches in the parity
game P for fi, then all profitable switches in the reachability
game Pε,n for fi (if any) must be within the set of neutral
edges neutral(P , fi) in the parity game P . We apply one of
these profitable switches at a time. By our definitions, this
profitable switch is neutral in the 2.5 player parity game.
Taking this profitable (in the reachability game Pε,n for a
small ε and some n ≥ ‖P‖) switch will improve the likelihood
of winning for Player 0 in the reachability game. By our
definition of ε, this implies that the likelihood of winning
cannot be decreased on any position in the parity game.
To see that the quality of the resulting strategy cannot
be higher for Player 0 in the 2.5 player parity game, recall
that Player 1 can simply follow his optimal strategy on the
neutral subgame. The likelihood of winning for Player 0 is the
likelihood of reaching her winning region, and this winning
region has not changed. Moreover, consider the evaluation of
the likelihood of reaching this winning region: since by fixing
the strategy for Player 1 the resulting game is an MDP, such an
evaluation can be obtained by solving a linear programming
problem (cf. the arXiv version for more details). The old mini-
mal non-negative solution to the resulting linear programming
problem is a solution to the new linear programming problem,
as it satisfies all constraints.
Putting these arguments together, likelihood of winning in
the parity game is not altered in any vertex by this change.
Hence, the set of neutral edges is not altered. 
This lemma implies that none of the subsequently applied
improvement steps applied on the 2.5 player reachability game
has any effect on the quality of the resulting strategy on the 2.5
player parity game. Together, the above lemmas and corollaries
therefore provide the correctness argument.
Theorem 4: The algorithm is correct.
Proof. Lemma 2 shows that, when Ifi and I ′fi are empty (i.e.
when the algorithm terminates), then the updates in the related
2.5 player reachability game will henceforth (and thus until
termination) not change the valuation for the 2.5 player parity
game. With Theorems 1 and 2 and our selection of small ε, it
follows that fi is an optimal strategy. The earlier lemmas and
corollaries in this subsection show that every strategy fi+1 ∈
Ifi∪I ′fi satisfies valPfi+1 > valPfi . Thus, the algorithm produces
strategies with strictly increasing quality in each step until it
terminates. As the game is finite, then also the set of strategies
is finite, thus the algorithm will terminate after finitely many
improvement steps with an optimal strategy. 
As usual with strategy improvement algorithms, we cannot
provide good bounds on the number of iterations. As reachabil-
ity games are a special case of 2.5 player games, all selection
rules considered by Friedmann [45], [46] will have exponential
lower bounds.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have written a prototypical implementation for the
approach of this paper. Our tool supports the input language
of the probabilistic model checker PRISM-GAMES [47], an
extension of PRISM [48] to stochastic Markov games. As case
study, we consider a battlefield consisting of n×n square tiles,
surrounded by a solid wall. On the battlefield there are two
robots, R0 and R1, and four marked zones zone1, . . . , zone4
at the corners, each of size 3×3. Each tile can be occupied by
at most one robot at a time. The robots act in strict alternation.
When it is the turn of a robot, this robot can move as follows:
decide a direction and move one field forward; decide a
direction and attempt to move two fields forward. In the latter
case, the robot moves two fields forward with a probability of
50%, but only one field forward with a probability of 50%.
If the robot would run into a wall or into the other robot, it
stops at the field before the obstacle. Robot R1 can also shoot
R0 instead of moving, which is destroyed with probability
pd
destr
where pdestr is the probability of destroying the robot
and d is the Euclidean distance between the two robots. Once
destroyed, R0 cannot move any more. We assume that we are
in control of R0 but cannot control the behaviour of R1. Our
goal is to maximise, under any possible behaviour of R1, the
probability of fulfilling a certain objective depending on the
zones, such as repeatedly visiting all zones infinitely often,
visiting the zones in a specific order, performing such visits
without entering other zones in the meanwhile, and so on. As
an example, we can specify that the robot eventually reaches
each zone by means of the probabilistic LTL (PLTL) formula
〈〈R0〉〉Pmax=?[
∧
i=1,...,4F zonei] requiring to maximise the
probability of satisfying
∧
i=1,...,4 F zonei by controlling R0
only.
The machine we used for the experiments is a 3.6 GHz Intel
Core i7-4790 with 16GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM of which
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TABLE I
ROBOTS ANALYSIS: DIFFERENT REACHABILITY PROPERTIES
property n b MPG pdestr = 0.1 pdestr = 0.3 pdestr = 0.5 pdestr = 0.7 pdestr = 0.9
vertices colours pmax tsol pmax tsol pmax tsol pmax tsol pmax tsol
Reachability
〈〈R0〉〉Pmax=?
[ Fzone1 ∧Fzone2
∧ Fzone3 ∧Fzone4]
7 1 663 409 2 0.9614711 33 0.8178044 22 0.6247858 22 0.3961410 21 0.1384328 23
7 2 1 090 537 2 0.9244309 56 0.6742610 66 0.4017138 57 0.1708971 58 0.0230085 52
7 3 1 517 665 2 0.8926820 89 0.5793073 87 0.2995397 77 0.0953904 86 0.0060025 68
7 4 1 944 793 2 0.8667039 112 0.5385632 109 0.2409219 96 0.0649772 107 0.0026513 85
7 5 2 371 921 2 0.8571299 147 0.5062357 144 0.2167625 127 0.0506530 140 0.0019157 112
Ordered
Reachability
〈〈R0〉〉Pmax=?
[F(zone1 ∧F zone2)]
8 1 528 168 2 0.9613511 23 0.8176058 19 0.6246643 21 0.3962011 20 0.1384974 19
8 2 868 986 2 0.9243652 35 0.6999023 44 0.4522051 35 0.2083732 42 0.0320509 40
8 3 1 209 804 2 0.9091132 62 0.6538475 71 0.3643938 56 0.1352710 60 0.0131408 58
8 4 1 550 622 2 0.9013742 91 0.6200998 91 0.3316778 72 0.1168758 74 0.0097312 71
8 5 1 891 440 2 0.8977303 113 0.6031945 108 0.3207408 90 0.1138603 88 0.0093679 83
Reach-Avoid
〈〈R0〉〉Pmax=?
[ ¬zone1 U zone2
∧ ¬zone4 U zone2
∧ Fzone3]
9 1 833 245 4 0.9447793 46 0.8005413 31 0.6125397 35 0.3914531 25 0.1372075 24
9 2 1 370 827 4 0.9095579 81 0.6824329 52 0.4411181 61 0.2089446 49 0.0302023 45
9 3 1 908 409 4 0.8972146 108 0.6375883 68 0.3792906 84 0.1444959 71 0.0106721 66
9 4 2 445 991 4 0.8936231 148 0.6221536 93 0.3478172 117 0.1158094 103 0.0051508 89
9 5 2 983 573 4 0.8918034 172 0.6162166 109 0.3366050 136 0.1010400 120 0.0035468 105
Reachability
〈〈R0〉〉Pmax=?
[ Fzone1 ∧Fzone2
∧ Fzone3 ∧Fzone4]
10 1 3 307 249 2 0.9614711 186 0.8178044 141 0.6247858 142 0.3961410 142 0.1384328 141
10 2 5 440 429 2 0.9244267 296 0.6755372 414 0.4017718 374 0.1665626 732 0.0207851 615
10 3 7 573 609 2 0.8931881 570 0.5742127 572 0.2864117 509 0.0847474 1019 0.0043153 861
10 4 9 706 789 2 0.8676441 530 0.5239018 794 0.2248369 735 0.0479367 1396 0.0009959 1610
10 5 11 839 969 2 0.8503684 968 0.4885654 980 0.1866995 971 0.0305890 1708 —TO—
12GB assigned to the tool; the timeout has been set to 30
minutes. We have applied our tool on a number of properties
that require the robot R0 to visit the different zones in a certain
order. In Table I we report the performance measurements for
these properties. Column “property” shows the PLTL formula
we consider, column “n” the width of the battlefield instance,
and column “b” the number of bullets R1 can shoot. For
the “MPG” part, we present the number of “vertices” of the
resulting MPG and the number of “colours”. In the remaining
columns, for each value of “pdestr”, we report the achieved
maximum probability “pmax” and the time “tsol” in seconds
needed to solve the game. Note that we cannot compare to
PRISM-GAMES because it does not support general PLTL
formulas, and we are not aware of other tools to compare
with.
As we can see, the algorithm performs quite well on MPGs
with few million states. It is worth mentioning that a large
share of the time spent is due to the evaluation of the 1.5 player
parity games in the construction of the profitable switches. For
instance, such an evaluation required 137 seconds out of 172
for the case n = 9, b = 5, and pdestr = 0.1. Since a large part
of these 1.5 player games are similar, we are investigating how
to avoid the repeated evaluation of similar parts to reduce the
running time. Generally, all improvements in the quantitative
solution of 1.5 player parity games and the qualitative solution
of 2.5 player parity games will reduce the running time of our
algorithm.
VII. DISCUSSION
We have combined a recursive algorithm for the quantitative
solution of 2.5 player parity games with a strategy improve-
ment algorithm, which lifts these results to the qualitative
solution of 2.5 player parity games. This shift is motivated
by the significant acceleration in the qualitative solution of
2.5 player parity games: while [49] scaled to a few thousand
vertices, [37] scales to tens of millions of states. This changes
the playing field and makes qualitative synthesis a realistic
target. It also raises the question if this technique can be
incorporated smoothly into a quantitative solver.
Previous approaches [27], [28] have focused on developing
a progress measure that allows for joining the two objective.
This has been achieved in studying strategy improvement
techniques that give preference to the likelihood of winning,
and overcome stalling by performing strategy improvement on
the larger qualitative game from [36] on the value classes.
This approach was reasonable at the time, where the updates
benefited from memorising the recently successful strategies
on the qualitative game. Moreover, focussing on value classes
keeps the part of the qualitative game under consideration
small, which is a reasonable approach when the cost of quali-
tative strategy improvement is considered significant. Building
on a fast solver for the qualitative analysis, we can afford to
progress in larger steps.
The main advancement, however, is as simple as it is
effective. We use strategy improvement where it has a simple
direct meaning (the likelihood to win), and we do not use
it where the progress measure is indirect (progress measure
within a value class). This has allowed us to transfer the recent
performance gains from qualitative solutions of 2.5 player
parity games [37] to their quantitative solution.
The difference in performance also explains the difference
in the approach regarding complexity. Just as the determin-
istic subexponential complexity of solving 2.5 player games
qualitatively is not very relevant in [37] (as this approach
would be very slow in practice), the expected subexponential
complexity in [27] is bought by exploiting a random facet
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method, which implies that only one edge is updated in every
step. From a theoretical angle, these complexity considerations
are interesting. From a practical angle, however, strategy
improvement algorithms that use multiple switches in every
step are usually faster and therefore preferable.
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APPENDIX
In this section we provide the details of the algorithm
presented in the main part of the paper. It is an implementation
of the algorithm we have described in Section IV and contains
our design decisions. They are not relevant for correctness.
We consider the extended game in Figure 4 for our running
example.
We start with an initialisation, where we solve 2.5 player
parity games qualitatively, and may require the qualitative
solution of subgames. For this initialisation, we first define
an extended qualitative solution of 2.5 player game as a
memoryless strategy for a player, which guarantees that s/he
wins almost surely on his or her almost sure winning region
and only loses almost surely on the almost sure winning region
of his or her opponent (cf. Section A).
We initialise our strategy improvement algorithm with an
extended qualitative solution. To obtain such a solution, we can
essentially use the algorithms known from ordinary qualitative
solutions, cf. Definition 12.
The normal improvement step is an instance of standard
strategy improvement algorithms. We evaluate the likelihood
of winning for Player 0 for her current strategy, by computing
the value optimal for Player 1 against this strategy. If we can
obtain an improvement by changing a decision in a Player 0
state, we do so.
The correctness proof in the main part of the paper uses the
related 2.5 player reachability game as a comparison point
in the correctness argument. It shows that, for sufficiently
small ε, each improvement selected by the algorithm is also
an improvement in the related reachability game, while the
stopping condition guarantees that further improvements in the
reachability games do not translate to further improvements in
the Markov parity game.
Consequently, our technique not only avoids using the tiny
ε, it also avoids the slow progression through updates that
are stale (lead to no improvement) on the parity game while
leading to an improvement on the reachability game resulting
from the translation.
Our main algorithm is given as MAIN( · ) in Algorithm 1.
It makes use of the auxiliary algorithms from Definition 12.
Definition 12: For an MPG P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, pri) we de-
note by QUALISOLVE(P) = (W, f) a method which computes
the winning regions W of Player 0 and a Player 0 strategy f
winning in W and arbitrary defined elsewhere.
Further, for A ⊆ V , we let REACH(P , A) = val denote the
result of computing mutually optimal reachability probabili-
ties, that is val = valP
′
where P ′ is the reachability game
P ′ = (V0, V1, Vr, E,A).
For an MPG P = (V0, ∅, Vr, E, pri), whose arena is an
MDP, we let EVALUATEMDP(P) = val denote the value of
the MDP, that is val = valP .
QUALISOLVE(P) can be effectively implemented by [37]
without having to construct intermediate 2 player games.
Note that efficient procedures for evaluating parity MDPs
exist [40]. Having to control only a single player, such
algorithms merely need to determine the almost sure winning
region of this single player (which is simple) and compute the
maximal probability to reach this region (cf. Appendix B).
(This does not hold for general 2.5 player parity games.)
In our setting, we obtain a parity MDP by fixing the strategy
for Player 0. We therefore have to compute the minimal values
for reachability. We can, however, transform this parity game
by adding 1 to the parity labels, so to complement the winning
condition, computing the maximal winning values for such a
complement, and finally returning 1 minus the value computed
for each node.
A. Initialisation
1) Determine the almost sure winning region W (and a
winning strategy for it) for Player 0 (Line 6). If the
winning region is empty, i.e. W = ∅, return (Line 7-9).
2) Solve the remaining game as reachability game with the
reachability objective to reach the winning region W
(Line 10), obtaining the value val and the strategy g for
the vertices with non-zero value.
Improve the strategy according to the reachability com-
putation (Line 11-13).
3) Call this algorithm recursively for the sub-game that
contains only the states with reachability probability 0,
improving the strategy using results from the recursive
calls (Line 14-18).
The main task of the initialisation phase performed by
INITIALIZE(P) is to provide a strategy f for Player 0 under
which the winning probability valPf (v) lies in ]0, 1[ for each
vertex v having the optimal winning probability valP(v)in
]0, 1[ while the strategy is winning in the region W where
Player 0 wins almost surely. We call such strategies realising.
Note that the correctness of the algorithm does not rely on
using realising strategies, it is merely a heuristic. It is chosen
to avoid that the algorithm gets stuck by a too large initial
winning region of player 1.
Example 2: We apply INITIALISE( · ) on the MPG Px from
Figure 4. The most significant steps of the algorithm on Px are
depicted in the pictures shown in Algorithm 1. The winning
region from Line 6 is W = {vw}, depicted as a dashed
box. Because v0 and v3 are outside the winning region, the
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Algorithm 1 Quantitative parity game solving algorithm
1: function MAIN(P) INITIALISE(Px), at line 7
0
0
0
0
0 0
1
0
1
W
INITIALISE(Px), at line 13
0
0
0
0
0 0
1
0
1
W
INITIALISE(Px ∩ {vl, v2, v3}), at line 7
0
0
1W
INITIALISE(Px ∩ {vl, v2, v3}), at line 13
0
0
1W
IMPROVE(Px, f), at line 21
0
0
0
0
0 0
1
0
1
IMPROVE(Px, f), at line 34
0
0
0
0
0 0
1
0
1
2: f ← INITIALISE(P)
3: return IMPROVE(P , f )
4: end function
5: function INITIALISE(P)
where P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob, pri) and V = V0 ∪ V1 ∪ Vr
6: (W, f)← QUALISOLVE(P)
7: if W = ∅ then
8: return f
9: end if
10: (val, g)← REACH(P ,W )
11: for v ∈ V0 \W do
12: f(v) ← g(v)
13: end for
14: V ′ ← { v ∈ V | val(v) = 0 }
15: g ← INITIALISE(P ∩ V ′)
16: for v ∈ V0 ∩ V ′ do
17: f(v) ← g(v)
18: end for
19: return f
20: end function
21: function IMPROVE(P , f )
where P = (V0, V1, Vr, E, prob, pri),
V = V0 ∪ V1 ∪ Vr,
E0 = E ∩ V0×V ,
f is a strategy
22: repeat
23: g ← f
24: P ′ ← Pf
25: val← EVALUATEMDP(P ′)
26: for (v, v′) ∈ E0 with val(v′) > val(v) do
27: f(v)← v′
28: end for
29: if f = g then
30: P ′ ← P ∩ neutral(P , val)
31: (W,h)← QUALISOLVE(P ′)
32: for v ∈W do
33: f(v) ← h(v)
34: end for
35: end if
36: until f = g
37: return f
38: end function
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choice of their edges is arbitrary and we can assume that
QUALISOLVE( · ) returns a strategy in which the edges e0,2
and e3,1 are chosen, depicted as full edges. The dashed edges
are those under the control of Player 1; the dash-dotted edges
are those randomly taken. As the winning region is nonempty,
we do not return in Lines 7-9. The reachability computation
in Line 10 and the following updates now set the choice for
v0 to e0,1; regarding v3, since initially the value for v3 is 0,
the initial choice for v2 is e2,2, so for v3 the choice between
e3,1 and e3,2 is irrelevant. After the updates, the only nodes
with winning probability 0 are vl, v2, and v3; this means that,
in Line 15, we call the function recursively with the game
consisting of the nodes {vl, v2, v3}. The winning region is
now W = {v2, v3}, obtained by Player 0 by choosing e3,2, so
the following reachability computation in Line 10 and updates
maintain the choice for v3 to e3,2. The only state still with
value 0 is vl, so the recursive call has as argument a game
consisting only of the node vl. However, this recursive step
is already left at Line 8 because the winning region is empty.
As there are no Player 0 nodes in such a one-node game, the
recursive call does not lead to further updates of the strategy.
B. Strategy improvement step
Input is a strategy and a parity game. Output is a superior
strategy and a parity game – or an optimality result for the
given strategy.
1) take a strategy f for Player 0 (Line 21)
2) construct the parity MDP for it (Line 24)
3) evaluate the parity MDP (Line 25)
4) if there are profitable switches: choose & return update
among them (Lines 26-28)
else (Lines 29-35)
a) build the sub-game that only uses neutral edges
(Line 30)
b) determine almost sure winning region & strategy
(Line 31)2 on it for Player 0
c) if the region is not empty, update the strategy ac-
cordingly. That is, in this winning region, update the
strategy such that it is winning. (Lines 32-34)
d) if the region is empty, terminate (f is optimal)
(Line 36)
This step is repeated until f is found to be optimal by the
algorithm.
Example 3: We reconsider the MPG Px from Figure 4
and the strategy f from Example 2 with f(v0) = e0,1. The
evaluation of the induced MDP in Line 25 leads to a value
of 0.55 in v0 and v1. There are no profitable switches, so
Lines 26-28 do not lead to any changes of f . The subgame P ′
computed in Line 30 does not contain e1,1, because choosing
this edge would lead to a value of 0.95, which is worse than
0.55 for Player 1. Evaluating P ′ in Line 31, we see that v0
and v1 are now part of the winning region, because Player 1
cannot leave it using e1,1. The choice for v0 is thus updated to
2optional: for the rest: determine maximal reachability strategy to this
region where the region can be reached with probability > 0
e0,2. In the next iteration of the improvement loop, there are
neither profitable switches, nor does the subgame of neutral
edges lead to any improvement. Thus, the algorithm terminates
at this point.
Consider a reachability MDP P = (V0, ∅, Vr, E, prob,R).
Then we have that, for each v ∈ V , we have valP(v) = wv ,
where w is the solution vector obtained from the following
linear programming problem:
minimise
∑{wv | v ∈ V }
subject to
wv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V
wv ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ R
wv ≥ wv′ ∀v ∈ V0, (v, v′) ∈ E
wv ≥
∑{ prob(v)(v′) · wv′ | (v, v′) ∈ E } ∀v ∈ Vr
The reduction from parity to reachability games from [38]
focuses on the tractability of the reductions. This has left us
in a tight spot between re-doing a simplified version of the
construction – which is arguably not required – and referring to
a complicated construction that consists of many steps and that
does not provide a theorem, which directly makes the claim we
make in Theorem 2. For this reason, we provide a reduction
below. Note that we make no claim regarding tractability. This
is not required, as the resulting game only occurs in proofs,
but is not used in our algorithm.
We use the translation from P to Pε,n with
lprob(ε, n, c) =
{
0 if c is even,
δc+1 if c is odd
and
wprob(ε, n, c) =
{
δc+1 if c is even,
0 if c is odd
where a suitable δ ∈ (0, 1] exists with the properties we require
for given n and ε. (Details follows.)
That is, we obtain the gadget construction from Figure 5.
We refer to the translation as Pδ. The main observation when
looking at δ > 0 is to follow what happens if we let δ shrink
towards 0.
Let f0 and f1 be strategies of Player 0 and 1 for P and f ′0
and f ′1 their similar strategies for Pδ (defined in the same
way as Theorem 2). Let L ⊆ V be a leaf component (a
strongly connected component without outgoing edges) in
Pf0,f1 . Recall that runs almost surely reach (and then get
trapped) in some leaf component for Markov chains. For
Markov chains with a parity acceptance condition, the runs
that reach a leaf component L are almost surely accepting if
the minimal priority cL = min{ pri(v) | v ∈ L } of the states
in L is even, and they are almost surely losing if cL is odd.
We make the following simple observations for Pδf ′
0
,f ′
1
.
(1) If δ goes to 0, the chance of reaching states in L′ =
L ∪ { v′ | v ∈ L } in Pδf ′
0
,f ′
1
from a state v0 ∈ V goes to
the chance of reaching L in Pf0,f1 from v0.
(2) When starting in L′, there is a δ′ ∈ (0, 0.5) such that,
for all δ ∈ (0, δ′), the chance of leaving to won or lost
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Fig. 5. Gadget construction.
before visiting a vertex v′ (the primed copy of v) with
pri(v) = cL is smaller than δc+1.5.
(3) When starting in L′ where cL is even, there is a δ′ > 0
such that, for all δ ∈ (0, δ′), the chance of reaching lost
is at most 3
√
δ times the chance of reaching won.
(4) When starting in L′ where cL is odd, there is a δ′ > 0
such that, for all δ ∈ (0, δ′), the chance of reaching won
is at most 3
√
δ times the chance of reaching lost.
(5) When δ goes to 0, the chance of reaching the won from
a state v0 ∈ V goes to the chance of winning in Pf0,f1
from v0.
To see (1), if we want to approach the likelihood with
precision 2ε, we choose an n such that L′ is reached after more
than n states with chance < n, and then choose δ ∈ (0, 1) such
that (1 − δ)n > 1 − ε. The latter property provides that the
difference in the chance of reaching L in n steps and reaching
L′ in 2n steps is less than ε.
To see (2), consider that, as L is a leaf component, there
is positive probability from every vertex w ∈ L to reach a
vertex v with minimal pri(v) = cL within n = |L| steps in
Pf,g. Let pmin > 0 be the smallest such probability. Then, in
L′, a vertex v′, which is the primed copy of a vertex v with
minimal pri(v) = cL, can be reached within 2n steps in Pδf ′,g′
with chance at least pmin(1 − δc+2)n > pmin2n . The chance to
reach won or lost within n steps and without reaching such a
vertex v′ first is at most n · δc+2.
Consequently, the chance of reaching won or lost prior to
reaching a vertex v′ which is the primed copy of a vertex v
with minimal colour pri(v) = cL is at most n·δ
c+2
n·δc+2+pmin
2n
. If
we choose δ small enough that δc+2 < pmin
n·2n and
√
δ < 2pmin
n·2n ,
then we get
n · δc+2
n · δc+2 + pmin2n
<
n · 2nδc+2
2pmin
< δc+1.5,
which provides the claim.
(3) and (4) follow immediately when δ is small enough such
that δ
c+1.5
δc+1(1−δc+1.5) =
√
δ
(1−δc+1.5) <
3
√
δ holds.
(5) finally follows with the previous points and the observa-
tion that won and lost are the only leaf components in Pδf ′
0
,f ′
1
,
and are therefore reached almost surely.
This establishes all properties we need for Theorem 2.
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